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Longstanding debates about the role of the university in national culture and the global economy have
entered a new phase in the past decade in most industrialized, and several industrializing, countries.
 One important focus of this debate is corporate involvement in academic scientific research.  Proponents
of the academic capitalism say that corporate involvement makes the university leaner, more agile,
better able to respond to the needs of the day.  Critics say that corporate involvement leaves society
without the independent, critical voices traditionally lodged in universities.  I argue that a science and
technology studies perspective, using case studies of research communities, can push this debate in
directions envisioned by neither proponents nor critics.  I use the development and commercialization
of the scanning tunneling microscope and the atomic force microscope as an example of how research
communities continually redraw the line between corporate and academic institutions.
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  The voices of editorialists and analysts excoriating or praising commercialization 
of products of higher education has recently grown very loud.
1  Yet this debate too often 
proceeds at an abstract level divorced from the small-scale settings where 
commercialization actually occurs.  The questions asked are too stark, and the dangers 
and benefits of academic entrepreneurialism are amplified beyond recognition.  As 
Steven Shapin notes in a recent survey, proponents’ and nay-sayers’ limited historical 
horizons lead to, among other things, ludicrous over-praising of incentives to patent 
academic research and over-dire warnings about the corporate university.
2  The few 
historical studies that could contribute to this debate, while praiseworthy, have 
                                                 
  My thanks to Mike Lynch, Arthur Daemmrich, Steve Shapin, John Staudenmaier, and David Kaiser for 
their advice and encouragement on various drafts of this paper.  Audiences at Arizona State, the American 
Sociological Association, the National Bureau of Economic Research, and the Chemical Heritage 
Foundation also provided useful comments.  Portions of this work have appeared in Technology and 
Culture.  This work was made possible by funding from NBER, the NSF, and the IEEE History Center, as 
well as by the generous cooperation of my interviewees. 
1 See Norman E. Bowie, ed., University-Business Partnerships: An Assessment, Issues in Academic Ethics 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994); Derek Bok, Universities in the Marketplace: The 
Commercialization of Higher Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Roger L. Geiger, 
Knowledge and Money: Research Universities and the Paradox of the Marketplace (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004); Frank Newman, Lara Couturier, and Jamie Scurry, The Future of Higher 
Education: Rhetoric, Reality, and the Risks of the Market (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004); David L. 
Kirp, Shakespeare, Einstein, and the Bottom Line: The Marketing of Higher Education (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2003); Eric Gould, The University in a Corporate Culture (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2003); and the essays in Donald G. Stein, ed., Buying In Or Selling Out: The 
Commercialization of the American Research University (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2004) 
and Joseph C. Burke, ed., Achieving Accountability in Higher Education: Balancing Public, Academic, and 
Market Demands (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004). 
2 Steven Shapin, “Ivory Trade,” London Review of Books 25, no. 17 (2003): 15-19. 
  1concentrated too narrowly on a handful of particularly entrepreneurial universities 
(Stanford and MIT), disciplines/industries (microelectronics and biotechnology), and 
regions (Silicon Valley and Route 128 near Boston).
3
  Yet these studies neglect important aspects of participants’ experience of 
corporate-academic cooperation.  Most researchers participate in networks that are 
geographically dispersed and that include colleagues in both academia and industry and 
from a variety of disciplines.  To understand the commercialization of academic 
knowledge, we need a multi-institutional, multi-disciplinary, multi-regional unit of 
analysis – what I will call an “instrumental community.”  By this I mean the porous 
group of people commonly oriented to building, developing, using, selling, and 
popularizing a particular technology of measurement.
4  Such communities are 
“instrumental” primarily in focusing on new research tools – microscopes, fruit flies, 
                                                 
3 For MIT and Stanford, see Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-
Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford, 1 ed. (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
1993); John Servos, “The industrial relations of science: Chemical engineering at MIT, 1900-1939,” Isis 81 
(1980): 531-49; R. S. Lowen, “Transforming the University - Administrators, Physicists, and Industrial and 
Federal Patronage At Stanford, 1935-49,” History of Education Quarterly 31, no. 3 (1991): 365-388; and 
C. Lecuyer, “Academic science and technology in the service of industry: MIT creates a "permeable" 
engineering school,” American Economic Review 88, no. 2 (1998): 28-33.  For biotech and 
microelectronics, see Martin Kenney, Biotechnology: The University-Industrial Complex (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1986) and Christophe Lécuyer, Making Silicon Valley: Innovation and the Growth 
of High Tech, 1930-1970 (Cambridge, Mass., 2006).  For a regional perspective, see Anna-Lee Saxenian, 
Regional Networks: Industrial Adaptation in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1993); Peter Hall and Ann Markusen, eds., Silicon Landscapes (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 
1985). 
4 The “instrumental community” bears a close resemblance to the “innovation communities” analyzed by 
Sonali K. Shah, “Open Beyond Software,” in Open Sources 2.0: The Continuing Evolution, ed. Danese 
Cooper, Chris DiBona, and Mark Stone (Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly Media, 2005).  “Instrumental 
community” is – so far as I know – my own formulation, but others have covered very similar ground, 
especially: Stuart Blume, Insight and Industry: On the Dynamics of Technological Change in Medicine 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992) and Terry Shinn, “Crossing Boundaries: The Emergence of Research-
Technology Communities,” in Universities and the Global Knowledge Economy: A Triple Helix of 
University-Industry-Government Relations, ed. Henry Etzkowitz and Loet Leydesdorff (London: Pinter, 
1997), 85-96. 
  2tobacco mosaic virus, lab rats, cathode ray tubes, etc.
5  Because such communities 
usually include academic and commercial participants, though, they will often seek ways 
to morph those tools into industrially-relevant devices.  Thus, such communities are also 
“instrumental” in focusing on new ways of doing or making things. 
  There are a number of excellent case studies of various instrumental communities, 
spanning from the seventeenth century to the 1960s.
6  Yet there have been virtually no 
studies of instrumental communities that have arisen since the late 1970s.  This is 
unfortunate in that this is the period on which the most overheated rhetoric about 
academic capitalism is focused.  We know that there have been significant changes in 
legislation, federal funding, corporate research, and the demographics of science in the 
past three decades.
7  We do not know how those changes have affected the operation of 
instrumental communities, nor how they have affected relationships between corporate 
and academic members of those communities.  This chapter aims to bring these issues to 
the fore through a case study of the development and commercialization of the scanning 
tunneling microscope (STM) and its near-relatives, the atomic force microscope (AFM) 
                                                 
5 For studies in this vein, see: Robert Kohler, Lords of the Fly (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1994), Boelie Elzen, “Two Ultracentrifuges: A Comparative Study of the Social Construction of Artefacts,” 
Social Studies of Science 16 (1986): 621-662; Karen Rader, Making Mice: Standardizing Animals for 
American Biomedical Research, 1900-1955 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
6 See, chronologically, Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, 
and the Experimental Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Myles W. Jackson, “Buying the 
dark lines of the spectrum: Joseph von Fraunhofer’s standard for the manufacture of optical glass,” in 
Scientific Credibility and Technical Standards in 19
th and Early 20
th Century Germany and Britain, Jed Z. 
Buchwald, ed. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1996), 1-22; and David Pantalony, “Seeing a voice: Rudolph 
Koenig's instruments for studying vowel sounds,” American Journal of Psychology 117, no. 3 (2004): 425-
442; Nicolas Rasmussen, Picture Control: The Electron Microscope and the Transformation of Biology in 
America, 1940-1960 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); Joan Lisa Bromberg, The Laser in 
America, 1950-1970 (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1991); and Timothy 
Lenoir and Christoph Lécuyer, “Instrument Makers and Discipline Builders: The Case of Nuclear Magnetic 
Resonance,” Perspectives on Science, no. 3 (1995): 276-345. 
7 As outlined in Philip Mirowski and Esther-Miriam Sent, “STS, the Economics of Science, and the 
Commercialization of University Science,” ed. Edward Hackett, Olga Amsterdamska, Michael Lynch, and 
Judy Wacjman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, forthcoming). 
  3and magnetic force microscope (MFM) – known collectively as probe microscopes.
8  
Twenty-five years ago there was one, home-made, unreliable STM at the IBM research 
lab in Zurich.  Today, through the joint efforts of corporate and academic researchers, 
there are thousands of AFMs, MFMs, and STMs at universities, national labs, and 
industrial research and quality control facilities.  High school students make STMs from 
Legos, while chip manufacturers use million-dollar AFMs on the factory floor.  One 
AFM has even made it to the surface of Mars. 
Inventing and Community-Building 
  Invention can be a precarious business, particularly for corporate scientists and 
engineers.
9  Inventions often emerge from digressions from assigned tasks, and may not 
initially meet any commercial objective.  The STM, for one, was this kind of institutional 
orphan.  Its inventors, Gerd Binnig and Heini Rohrer, had been tasked with finding new 
                                                 
8 The technical details of the microscopes are important to this story, but can be glossed for the purposes of 
this chapter.  Basically, all scanning probe microscopes bring a very small solid probe very close (usually 
to within a nanometer – one billionth of a meter) to a sample and measure the strength of different kinds of 
interactions between probe and sample to determine the height (and other characteristics) of the sample.  
The probe is then rastered much like the pixels on a TV screen and a matrix of values for the strength of the 
tip-sample interaction is converted into a visual “picture” of the surface.  Different probe microscopes use 
different kinds of tip-sample interactions to generate their images.  The first, the STM, works by putting a 
voltage difference between the tip and a metal or semiconductor sample; when the tip is brought close to 
the sample, some electrons will quantum mechanically “tunnel” between them.  The number of electrons 
that do so (the “tunnel current”) is exponentially dependent on the distance between tip and sample; also, 
the stream of tunneling electrons is very narrow.  Thus, an STM has ultrahigh resolution both vertically and 
laterally – most STMs can actually see individual atoms on many samples.  Today, the STM’s younger 
cousin, the atomic force microscope, is more commonly used.  An AFM uses a very small but flexible 
cantilever as a probe; as the tip of the cantilever (usually weighted with a small pyramid of extra atoms) is 
brought close to the surface, the cantilever bends due to the attraction or repulsion of interatomic forces 
between tip and sample.  The degree of bending is then a proxy for the height of the surface.  Originally 
this bending was measured by putting an STM on the back of the cantilever; today the deflection is 
detected by bouncing a laser off the cantilever and measuring the movement of the reflected spot.  Another 
common and industrially-relevant tool, the magnetic force microscope, works in a similar way, but uses a 
magnetic tip to map the strength of magnetic domains on a surface, rather than surface height.  Both the 
AFM and MFM have slightly less resolution than the STM (i.e. they cannot usually see single atoms); yet 
because they (unlike the STM) can be used on insulators as well as conductors, and in air and fluids as well 
as vacuum, they have become much more popular. 
9 Indeed, inventors of instruments (or those who take credit for having invented them) often seem to have 
vexed positions within the firms that employ them.  See, for instance, the description of Kary Mullis’ 
antagonistic relationship with Cetus in Paul Rabinow, Making PCR: A Story of Biotechnology (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
  4ways to characterize thin films used in an advanced supercomputer project on which IBM 
had staked much of its reputation.  Yet by the time they came up with the STM as an 
answer to the thin film problem, the supercomputer project had been canceled.
10  Binnig 
and Rohrer’s response was three-fold.  First, they hid the STM from managerial view – 
easy enough at the Zurich lab, far from corporate headquarters and well-known for lax 
oversight.  Second, they began querying IBM colleagues about new ways to use the 
STM, eventually attracting interest from the company’s large cadre of semiconductor 
surface scientists. 
  Their third, key strategy was to cultivate an extramural, academic community 
committed to the STM by encouraging their network of acquaintances to replicate the 
instrument.  As this instrumental community grew both inside and outside Big Blue, 
IBM’s senior research managers decided that the STM – despite the absence of 
commercial relevance – should become a major corporate project.  Multiple groups of 
scientists at the IBM laboratories in Zurich, Yorktown Heights, New York and Almaden, 
California were recruited out of graduate school to build STMs and make discoveries that 
would bring credit to the instrument and to the company.  In turn, IBM’s research 
archrival, Bell Labs, saw a need to steal Big Blue’s thunder and began recruiting its own 
cadre of STMers. 
  The dynamics of building the STM community show how the corporate and 
academic worlds are interpermeated much more thoroughly and enduringly than is often 
noticed in debates about academic commercialization.  Binnig and Rohrer could quickly 
cultivate a set of academic STM replicators because of networks of personnel exchange 
                                                 
10 G. Binnig and H. Rohrer, “The Scanning Tunneling Microscope,” Scientific American 253, no. 2 (1985): 
50-6 and G. Binnig and H. Rohrer, “Scanning Tunneling Microscopy - From Birth to Adolescence,” 
Reviews of Modern Physics 59, no. 3 (1987): 615-625. 
  5between IBM and various universities – some replicators were professors taking 
sabbaticals in Zurich, some were academics Rohrer had known from his own sabbaticals 
at universities, and some were people who had been postdocs at IBM or currently had 
students serving postdoctoral appointments there.
11
  Similarly, interest in the STM grew within IBM and Bell Labs not because it 
could solve commercially-relevant problems, but because it could generate credible 
knowledge within academic disciplines such as physics and surface science.
12  Accolades 
from an academic audience – evidenced by standing-room-only crowds at American 
Physical Society meetings, awarding of the Nobel Prize to Binnig and Rohrer in 1986, 
and the growth of academic STM – were largely the aim of IBM’s STM program.  
Moreover, prestige within a hot, new instrumental community like STM in turn allowed 
IBM to recruit the best graduate students as postdocs and junior researchers – exactly the 
people who built the second and third generations of IBM’s tunneling microscopes.  
Today, some of those same people have returned IBM’s investment by becoming the 
leading figures in nanotechnology research – securing Big Blue’s reputation and 
intellectual property in what is, at last, a commercially important area. 
Dynamics of Community 
                                                 
11 The source material for this study is a collection of interviews with 150+ probe microscopists conducted 
between 2000 and 2004.  I will reference specific oral histories using an alphanumeric code listed in the 
appendix to this article.  Information about the corporate-academic network of sabbaticals and hires came 
from, among others, <TB1>, <JM1>, and <PH1>. 
12 There is rich historical material on the large, corporate labs of the twentieth century: George Wise, Willis 
R. Whitney, General Electric, and the Origins of U.S. Industrial Research (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1985); Michael Riordan and Lillian Hoddeson, Crystal Fire: The Birth of the Information 
Age (New York: Norton, 1997); Lillian Hartmann Hoddeson, “The roots of solid-state research at Bell 
Labs,” Physics Today  (1977); Leonard Reich, The Making of American Industrial Research: Science and 
Business at GE and Bell, 1876-1926 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985).  Most relevant 
here are analyses of the tenuous relationship between research and production at IBM: Ross Knox Bassett, 
To the Digital Age: Research Labs, Start-Up Companies, and the Rise of MOS Technology (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins, 2002); Scott Knowles and Stuart W. Leslie, “’Industrial Versailles’ – Eero Saarinen’s 
Corporate Campuses for GM, IBM, and AT&T,” Isis 92: 1-33. 
  6  By 1986, then, the STM was no longer a precarious technology.  Crucially, the 
instrumental community beginning to take shape was dominated by corporate groups, 
especially from IBM and Bell Labs.  Early academic STMers, such as Paul Hansma at the 
University of California at Santa Barbara (UCSB), Calvin Quate at Stanford, and John 
Baldeschwieler at Caltech, were important contributors to the community; yet these 
academics struggled to compete with corporate groups that were better-resourced and 
(more importantly) were working alongside (or in competition with) numerous other 
STMers in the same building.  The tacit knowledge needed to build an STM flowed more 
quickly at IBM and Bell Labs, allowing those organizations to rapidly expand their 
commitment to STM.
13
  This meant the questions most important to the early STM community were those 
of relevance to groups at IBM and Bell Labs.  In particular, since Binnig and Rohrer had 
been most successful in enrolling colleagues interested in the surface structure of metals 
and semiconductors, those the community’s chosen materials.  Indeed, a few surfaces 
(especially of silicon) served as yardsticks for measuring whether a group had a working 
STM or not – until a group’s STM had resolved single atoms of silicon, its builders could 
not enter the top tier of STM builders.
14  Other metal and semiconductor surfaces served 
as milestones, with different groups racing each other to be the first to achieve atomic 
resolution.  Thus, interest in semiconductors – obviously strong at IBM and Bell Labs – 
                                                 
13 For treatments of the concept of tacit knowledge, especially as applied to instrument-building, see H. M. 
Collins, “The Seven Sexes: A Study in the Sociology of a Phenomenon, or the Replication of Experiments 
in Physics,” Sociology 9, no. 2 (May) (1975): 205-224; Harry Collins, “Tacit Knowledge, Trust, and the Q 
of Sapphire,” Social Studies of Science 31, no. 1 (2001): 71-86; and Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: 
Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962). 
14 <JD2>, <PW2>. 
  7helped standardize activity in the community and allowed participants to judge each 
other’s progress. 
  Initially, academics such as Quate and Baldeschwieler tried to keep up in these 
races.  Notably, Quate, located near both Silicon Valley and a cadre of former students 
and postdocs at IBM Almaden, had the most success in this area.  Yet even he struggled 
to develop familiarity in handling metals and semiconductors among his students and in 
making his results credible to corporate STMers.
15  Hansma, meanwhile, saw that IBM 
and Bell Labs would continue to dominate the study of metal and semiconductor surfaces 
and began carving alternative niches.
16  Soon, Quate, Baldeschwieler, and other 
academics followed suit, so that the STM community began to segregate into two 
moieties – surface science STMers, dominated by (but not exclusive to) corporate and 
national laboratories on the East Coast; and non-surface scientists, dominated by (but not 
exclusive to) universities on the West Coast.
17
  These two moieties continued to share a great deal.  Members of each 
occasionally collaborated, and a few people moved from one to the other.  More 
importantly, the basic design of the STM was – at this stage – common to both, so design 
innovations in one moiety could be transported to the other.  This meant that 
opportunities for co-presence – conferences and visits and sabbaticals between labs – 
continued to be useful.  Yet in a number of areas the two moieties established starkly 
different styles.  In particular, corporate STMers, coming out of a surface science 
                                                 
15 <JD2>. 
16 <PH1>, <BD2>. 
17 Crucial members of the latter, predominantly academic, moiety were Quate’s allies within IBM: Dan 
Rugar, John Foster, and Tom Albrecht (former students who worked at IBM Almaden); Kumar 
Wickramasinghe (a former postdoc, later at IBM Yorktown); and Gerd Binnig (who took a sabbatical at 
Stanford in 1985-6). 
  8tradition that valued ultraclean samples and rigid control of conditions, built their STMs 
for compatibility with ultrahigh vacuum (UHV) chambers.  These chambers were large, 
finicky, expensive, and time-consuming, so academic STMers developed alternatives 
such as STM in air, in water, in oil, and in a variety of gases.
18
  Freed from the constraints of UHV and the need to please surface scientists, 
academic STMers moved to a radically open-ended, sometimes chaotic mode of 
experimentation.  They saw that corporate surface science STM had succeeded by 
appealing to specific disciplinary audiences and by orienting to a few yardstick materials 
by which members of the community could be measured, and sought out new audiences 
and yardstick materials of their own.  It was unclear, though, which audiences might 
accept the STM, and how the STM should be adapted to achieve acceptance.  Thus, 
academics like Quate and Hansma encouraged their students to quickly build a wide 
variety of microscopes and to playfully use them to characterize haphazard materials – 
leaves of houseplants, polaroids, bone from ribeye steaks, ice, the electrochemistry of 
Coke versus Pepsi, etc.
19  This bricolage fit well with these groups’ shoestring operation 
(in contrast to the corporate groups) and extended even into microscope-building: the 
Baldeschwieler group made STM probes from pencil leads, for instance, while the 
Hansma group made AFM tips from hand-crushed pawn shop diamonds, glued to tin foil 
cantilevers with brushes made from their own eyebrow hairs. 
  Yet such indiscipline could damage STM’s acceptance by new disciplinary 
audiences, since the microscope-builders did not know how to prepare samples and 
interpret images in ways that would be credible to, for example, biologists, 
                                                 
18 <CP1>, <PH1>. 
19 <CP1>, <JN1>. 
  9electrochemists, or materials scientists.  Thus, Quate, Hansma, and other academic 
STMers began bringing representatives (postdocs or young professors) from potential 
new disciplinary audiences in to work with their students, learn how to use the 
microscope, show the group how to prepare samples, and then proselytize for the 
technique within their home community.  Often, these people took a microscope with 
them when they left, or founded their own microscope-building group, and used their 
knowledge of probe microscopy as a tool for gaining prestige among disciplinary 
colleagues and securing tenure from their universities.
20
  Thus, the differences between the two moieties were as much about pedagogy and 
career arc as they were about samples, designs, and audience.  In groups such as Quate’s 
and Hansma’s (mirrored, in part, by their collaborators’ groups), graduate students were 
trained to build instruments quickly and collaboratively, to think primarily about novel 
design rather than use; postdocs, meanwhile, were trained to develop new uses out of 
those designs, and to integrate a new technology into an established discipline – STM for 
biology or materials science or electrochemistry.  In the corporate labs, postdocs, too, 
underwent a kind of training – in a position of constant oversight by colleagues and 
managers with the expertise and power to judge their work and affect their careers, 
corporate postdocs learned to build and use STMs geared specifically to institutional 
needs.  Thus, corporate surface science STMs all looked relatively similar and were used 
                                                 
20 <AG1>, <HG1>, <JN1>.  The propagation of a technique through the “cascade” of postdocs and 
collaborators away from one of the centers of an instrumental community is described in David Kaiser, 
Drawing Things Apart: The Dispersion of Feynman Diagrams in Postwar Physics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005). 
  10to look at the same handful of samples – though with enough variation to demonstrate 
their builders’ personal qualities of initiative, creativity, and experimental ingenuity.
21
  In other words, the instrumental community growing around the STM included 
elements of pedagogy at all participating sites, rather than just in the academic groups – 
the STM was a technology for turning young researchers into full-fledged scientists as 
much as a new technique for characterizing materials.  Analysts of academic capitalism 
should keep this in mind – universities have no monopoly on training in science, and the 
paths of pedagogy often seamlessly cross from the academic to the corporate world.  
Moreover, in this particular case the pedagogical uses of the STM encouraged a wider 
division of labor in the instrumental community.  Because corporate postdocs were 
promoted based on their ability to integrate the STM with surface science, graduate 
students building STMs were instead encouraged to expand the instrument’s capabilities 
into new areas.  Corporations did, indeed, “influence” the direction of academic research 
here; but whereas many critics decry the constrictive, harmful effects of corporate 
influence, in this case corporate actors encouraged academics to adopt a diversity of 
approaches and an expansive outlook. 
Building and Buying 
  In this sense, pedagogy drove the two moieties of early STM apart; yet in a 
variety of ways, corporate and academic participants were inseparable, particularly 
around practices of building microscopes and finding samples to characterize.  Until 
1986, all probe microscopes were “home-built” in that they were put together by the 
groups that were using them.  Yet home-built instruments were not made entirely from 
scratch – some components were made by hand, but most were bought from commercial 
                                                 
21 <BW2>. 
  11suppliers.  STM designs were strongly shaped by the commercial availability of 
components such as op amps and probe materials; but STM builders were also active 
consumers.  They took commercial products and adapted them for unforeseen uses and 
negotiated with suppliers for equipment (vacuum chambers, piezoelectric crystals, video 
output devices, etc.) modified for their specific applications.
22  Some suppliers, such as 
Burleigh (a piezoceramic maker in upstate New York) modified their products, using the 
advice of prominent STMers, so that they could sell the modified items specifically for 
the STM market.
23  That is, professors were crucial both as consumers and producers.  
Most favorable analyses of academic capitalism have focused on academics as producers, 
with a view to stimulating professorial start-up companies; yet universities may find that 
the best way to gain a stake in an instrumental community is by encouraging professors 
to be smart, savvy, active consumers who have leverage with manufacturers both through 
their expertise and their potential for building their own product (or even starting a 
competing firm). 
  In a number of indirect and often counter-intuitive ways, commerce supplied the 
infrastructure of knowledge and standardization needed to make the STM community 
grow.  Information about sources of reliable components and materials was a major topic 
of “gossip” among early STM builders.  Those who had built working instruments 
recommended particular brands to new members of the community; and those 
                                                 
22 Much recent history of technology has focused on the active role of users.  For consumers’ adaptations of 
artifacts for uses that manufacturers were unaware of, or even opposed, see Ronald Kline and Trevor Pinch, 
“Users as Agents of Technological Change: The Social Construction of the Automobile in the Rural United 
States,” Technology and Culture 37, no. October (1996): 763-95.  For users’ pressure on companies (often 
– as in instrumental communities – through threats to form their own cooperatives or firms), see Claude S. 
Fischer, America Calling: A Social History of the Telephone to 1940 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1992).  For an overview of different kinds of user activity, see the essays in Nelly Oudshoorn and 
Trevor Pinch, eds., How Users Matter: The Co-Construction of Users and Technologies (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2003). 
23 <DF1>. 
  12newcomers, anxious to make up for lost time, rarely questioned their predecessors’ 
advice.  Old-timers gladly gave newcomers blueprints and recommendations on 
suppliers, so that STM-building came to resemble doing a project from Popular 
Mechanics.  Brands became an important carrier of the tacit knowledge of microscope-
building, and STM-building became standardized through STMers’ nearly ritualistic 
allegiance to those brands, even when the technical rationale for the brand disappeared.  
For instance, IBM’s STMers used a trademarked rubber called Viton (from Dupont) to 
dampen vibration, because Viton could survive ultrahigh vacuum.
24  Later, as IBM’s 
blueprints disseminated, Viton became a hallmark of tunneling microscopy, even in 
academic STMs used in air or fluid, not vacuum.
25
  A commercial infrastructure also helped STMers standardize the materials they 
characterized.  As Daniel Lee Kleinman has noted, this kind of corporate “influence” on 
research is pervasive but indirect.
26  Yet tapping into the right commercial infrastructure 
can be crucial to growing an instrumental community and ensuring the credibility of its 
members’ expertise – reliable, cheap commercial sources of materials give newcomers 
easy access to research, and give the rest of the community a yardstick by which to 
measure newcomers’ progress.  Among corporate surface science STMers, this yardstick 
was provided by a few key metal and semiconductor samples on which newcomers had to 
prove their machines.  When academic STMers designed microscopes for use in air and 
water, they needed alternative yardstick materials.  Gold, paraffin, and graphite vied for 
                                                 
24 <CG1>, <RT1>, <VE1>. 
25 For similar instances of practices spreading through an experimental community through transmission of 
knowledge about particular brands, see Kathleen Jordan and Michael Lynch, “The dissemination, 
standardization, and routinization of a molecular biological technique,” Social Studies of Science 28, no. 5-
6 (1998): 773-800. 
26 Daniel Lee Kleinman, Impure Cultures: University Biology and the World of Commerce (Madison: 
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  13the job; but graphite won out partly because ultrapure samples could be obtained 
cheaply.
27  Union Carbide used graphite to make monochromators for neutrons, an 
application requiring extraordinarily pure samples – hence, they rejected large amounts of 
slightly imperfect graphite still pure enough for STMers.  The Quate group heard about 
this and alerted other academic groups who then called Union Carbide’s graphite man, 
Arthur Moore, to get cheap, standardized samples.  Soon, the STM community was 
awash in graphite, such that talks about that material finally outnumbered talks on 
semiconductors at the annual STM conferences. 
  Sometimes, the industrial relevance of materials was a more direct influence 
acting on academic microscopists, feeding back into the designs of their instruments.  Yet 
the arrow of corporate-academic influence here was dramatically non-linear.  Cal Quate, 
for instance, framed his STM work within Stanford’s long tradition of industrial ties and 
his own involvement in developing acoustic microscopy in the ’70s as a non-destructive 
characterization tool for manufacturing.
28  Non-destructive testing held tremendous 
promise for microelectronics, where chips are inspected throughout manufacturing yet 
where traditional tools (especially electron microscopy) require breaking and discarding 
expensive silicon wafers.  Quate moved into STM believing it could be the next 
generation non-destructive evaluation tool; and he was quickly followed by his former 
students and postdocs at IBM.
29
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  14  STM, though, requires a conducting (metal or semiconductor) sample, whereas 
most microelectronic materials have an insulating oxide layer.  Indeed, controlled growth 
of oxides is crucial to turning silicon wafers into integrated circuits.  This was 
unproblematic for corporate surface scientists tasked with generating basic knowledge 
about materials like silicon and gallium arsenide.  Yet STM’s restriction to conducting 
materials blocked its use in non-destructive testing and hindered movement into fields 
other than surface science.  Those who wanted to carve interdisciplinary niches for STM 
saw its sample constraints as suffocating; chief among these were Gerd Binnig (an IBM 
employee but not a surface scientist) and Cal Quate (and his former students and postdocs 
at IBM).  So when IBM allowed Binnig to take a sabbatical at Stanford in 1985-6, he and 
Quate pushed past the STM to invent the AFM – which, because it uses interatomic 
forces rather than tunneling to sense height, can map insulating materials.  Thus, Quate 
positioned his research much further downstream in IBM’s manufacturing cycle than 
most of IBM’s own STMers and, together, IBM and Stanford dramatically shifted the 
world of academic and corporate probe microscopy. 
Commercialization and Gray Markets 
  What we’ve seen so far, then, are the more intricate, unglamorous ways corporate 
and academic actors are linked within an instrumental community – through pedagogy, 
through institutional politics, through commercial infrastructures, through tacit 
knowledge.  Most of relationships I’ve outlined thus far are not the ones that exercise 
proponents and critics of academic capitalism – large corporate buy-ins to academic 
departments, professors keeping research secret so they can patent it, corporations and 
universities colluding to suppress unfavorable results. 
  15  One topic central to the academic capitalism debate will occupy the rest of this 
paper – the commercialization of academic research and the founding of professorial 
start-up companies.  Yet I will show that commercialization only happens when it helps 
participants position themselves within an instrumental community; and that the 
commercialization process is not sudden and dramatic, but built slowly and quietly from 
the kinds of practices I have described thus far. 
  The proximate basis for commercialization of probe microscopy was the desire on 
the part of elite STMers to grow a larger community in which their groups would be 
centers of expertise.
30  This desire was strong among both corporate and academic 
groups, though the motivations differed in the two moieties.  At IBM and (to a lesser 
extent) Bell Labs, research managers wanted to increase the number of in-house STM 
groups, so as to keep the center of the STM community within the corporation.  
Academics like Quate and Hansma wanted to grow the STM (and AFM) community 
because they were looking for new applications and audiences, and because they wanted 
to build a critical mass committed to non-surface science probe microscopy. 
  Thus, the stimulus to (a kind of) commercialization existed in both the corporate 
and academic environments, as did the practices and knowledge from which this proto-
commercialization could be constructed.  Both Bell Labs and IBM, for instance, built 
something like an internal free market for tunneling microscopy, with multiple groups in 
different parts of the building set to work on very similar tasks and compete for the 
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  16attention of senior managers.  But both companies also developed an infrastructure for 
STM research that allowed groups to get up to speed very quickly.  For instance, Bell 
Labs housed several (varying between two and four) STMs in an old tractor shed on the 
edge of its property; there, microscope builders could very quickly trade ideas, materials, 
blueprints, and software – very much in the same way that Quate’s students worked on 
multiple microscopes at once and cannibalized parts from one project to another.
31
  IBM took the internal STM market/infrastructure to even greater lengths.  IBM 
had been first into STM, yet it took other IBM groups just as long – almost two years in 
some cases – as everyone else to replicate the Zurich instrument.  Thus, senior 
management cast about for ways to package the tacit knowledge of instrument-building 
and reduce replication time.  The preferred strategy was to make semi-standardized, 
batch-produced STM packages available to its researchers.
32  The first was the “Blue 
Box” designed by Othmar Marti, a Swiss graduate student doing doctoral work at IBM 
Zurich.
33  The Blue Box was primarily an electronics package – researchers constructed 
the hardware themselves, often using the Zurich team’s designs.  STM electronics 
presented a significant challenge – complicated feedback circuitry brings the probe to the 
surface, reads out and controls the tunnel current, and rasters the tip without crashing.  
Later, the success of the Blue Box in allowing newcomers to work around these 
difficulties inspired a more ambitious effort at IBM Yorktown.  There, Joe Demuth, 
manager of an STM group, assigned his postdocs to work with Yorktown’s Central 
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  17Scientific Services shop to develop and batch-produce complete STMs to “sell” to other 
Yorktowners.
34
  By 1990, 10 to 20 of these CSS STM’s were in use at Yorktown and the nearby 
Hawthorne facility; some also traveled to academic groups when postdocs left to become 
professors.
35  Yorktown management encouraged use of the CSS STM by making its 
purchase a zero-cost budget item.  Still, groups had to invest labor – usually a postdoc – 
to make the microscope productive.  This confronted its postdoc users with a dilemma.  
They needed to creatively solve technical problems and display initiative to managers to 
advance to staff positions; and advancement also required navigating competitive 
institutional politics, where groups worked in parallel on similar projects and were 
rewarded relative to each other.  Postdocs using the CSS STM found they were viewed as 
partisans of Demuth’s style of microscopy.  To avoid alienating other factions at 
Yorktown, and display their own experimental prowess, they redesigned and rebuilt large 
parts of the CSS instrument.
36  That is, the organization of Yorktown research kept the 
CSS microscope from turning into a widely-commercialized black box.
37
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  18  The CSS STM was a kind of commercialization of tunneling microscopy, for the 
internal IBM market.  Had Yorktown culture promoted formation of start-ups or 
collaborations with instrument manufacturers, the CSS microscope could have become 
the first mass-marketed STM.  After the early ’90s recession made IBM leaner and more 
outward-looking, Big Blue did market an AFM – Yorktown’s “SXM” – to the 
semiconductor industry.  This exception, though, proves the rule.  The SXM was 
invented by a former Quate postdoc, and owed much to Quate’s style of work.  Yet 
commercialization was hindered by its IBM origins – though capable of astonishing 
resolution of the sidewalls of integrated circuit features, it was too finicky and unreliable 
(it needed a Ph.D. to operate) to attract an industry devoted to tools kept in continuous 
operation by relatively unskilled workers.
38
  In contrast, commercialization was more successful from academic STM and 
AFM groups largely because of the outward-looking, multidisciplinary style they had 
cultivated in order to avoid competing with the more insular and disciplined surface 
scientists at IBM and Bell Labs.  People like Binnig, Rohrer, Quate, and Hansma were 
extraordinarily open with newcomers, freely offering them blueprints and advice in order 
to build a critical mass of non-surface science probe microscopists.  Thus, the circulation 
of materials and ideas – a kind of “gray market” – became the norm in academic STM 
and AFM.
39  Software, in particular, passed from group to group, and student cohort to 
cohort within research groups.  Both academic and corporate groups wrote code that they 
gave to collaborators, strengthening their group’s position in the instrumental community, 
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  19and ensuring access to collaborators’ modifications to the code.
40  Sometimes code was 
given for free, sometimes at nominal cost; profit was not the motive for dissemination. 
  The most well-traveled hardware innovation was the microfabricated AFM 
cantilever.  One perceived defect of early AFMs was that probes were laboriously hand-
made from small strips of aluminum foil with a tiny sliver of diamond glued on one side 
and a tiny shard of glass on the other.
41  Although these cantilevers could yield exquisite 
AFM images, each required considerable time and training, and results were so particular 
to one cantilever and its maker that images taken with different cantilevers were difficult 
to compare.  Hand-made cantilevers sufficed early on, when every image was new and 
spectacular; but as the technique matured, AFMers sought standardization.  The Quate 
group delivered this by integrating itself with microlithography expertise at Stanford and 
around Silicon Valley.  Over several years, Quate shared students with other electrical 
engineering professors at Stanford, allowing them to learn AFM before going to the clean 
rooms to learn to pattern and etch silicon into small, standardized batches of cantilevers.  
By 1990, Quate began sending surplus probes to friends and collaborators, sometimes so 
he and his students could share authorship of collaborators’ papers.  Quickly, Quate-type 
probes became essential to the AFM infrastructure.
42
  At the same time, Quate and Hansma prepared the ground for commercialization 
through their practice of bringing in collaborators from a variety of disciplines.  On the 
one hand, these collaborators would found their own STM or AFM groups and 
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  20effectively “advertise” for the technique, building interest – what would become markets 
– in probe microscopy among biologists, electrochemists, mineralogists, and so forth.  On 
the other hand, within the Quate and Hansma groups graduate students learned the art of 
dealing with potential “customers” from other disciplines and designing microscopes 
with their needs in mind.  The leap from these practices to outright commercialization 
was very small. 
  In the end, the first to make this leap was a Quate student, Doug Smith, who 
founded the Tunneling Microscope Company in 1986.  Notably, though, there was 
wariness about this commercialization on both the supply and demand sides.  Smith had 
only one “employee”, a fellow student who helped put together scanners, and he recruited 
customers by word of mouth.  He viewed the company less as an ongoing enterprise than 
as a way to sweeten the hardships of graduate school – a well-circulated story is that he 
sold just enough microscopes to buy a BMW before taking a postdoc.  Yet despite the 
small size of this venture, Quate himself was ambivalent and pushed Smith to separate 
scholarship and business more cleanly – “Dr. Quate said ‘graduate students work, eat, 
and sleep, and most of the time they go hungry.’  You can’t have a company and be a 
graduate student at the same time, so Doug had to finish up and move out”.
43
  On the demand side, Smith’s customers were in much the same position as the 
postdocs at IBM who were presented with the Blue Box or CSS STM.  They saw a 
commercial STM as a way to quickly catch up and join a hot new instrumental 
community; yet they knew that if they were to join the elite of that community, they 
would have to demonstrate instrument-building virtuosity, and gear their STM to 
specific, arcane applications.  Thus, like the batch-produced IBM instruments, Smith’s 
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  21commercial STMs were more starter kits than black-boxed devices.  To use the 
instrument, customers needed to construct much of it on their own.
44  All Smith sold was 
the microscope “head” – the piezoelectric scanner, tip, base, and vibration-isolating 
stacks of Viton.  Customers built the electronics themselves, customizing the microscope 
for their own applications. 
  In debates about academic capitalism, the commodification of academic expertise 
is usually treated as an undifferentiated matter, as are the consumers of that expertise.  
Yet it should be clear from the STM and AFM story that the symbolic elements of the 
“product” sold by members of an instrumental community is crucial and ever-changing.  
Today, when customers by an off-the-shelf AFM, they generally are buying all of the 
expertise of microscope-building so that they won’t have to develop it themselves.  Early 
on that expertise was exactly what customers of commercial STMs did not want to buy; 
instead, they were purchasing time and membership in a community and the opportunity 
to develop their own instrument-building expertise.  Consumers wanted to be on an equal 
footing with producers, whether in a commercial or academic setting.  Thus, there was no 
“academic ethos” that was corrupted by these early ventures into batch production; yet 
neither was there a “corporate ethos” demanding that firms make money from the STMs 
their employees had built.  Rather, in both settings it was the culture of the instrumental 
community that shaped the meanings (and timetable) of commercialization. 
Digital Instruments 
  Commercialization of the STM, then, was a process accomplished through a 
series of minute, unremarkable steps – very little separated the home-built STM, made 
with parts ordered from catalogs, often using blueprints given by colleagues, from the 
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  22STMs sold by Smith and (internally) IBM.  The next step was only slightly more 
dramatic – the founding of organizations dedicated wholly to manufacturing and selling 
probe microscopes.  Critics and proponents of academic capitalism both lay heavy 
emphasis on the founding of start-ups; it is seen both as the best means to extract profit 
from academic work, and as the ultimate distraction from the university’s pedagogical 
mission.  Yet both these views neglect the realities of how start-ups operate within an 
instrumental community.  Profit is often the least visible (and least successful) motivation 
for founding a start-up; and start-ups often continue and enhance the pedagogical culture 
of an instrumental community rather than despoiling it. 
  Digital Instruments, the first true start-up in the probe microscopy community, 
offers vivid illustration that the most successful start-ups may be those that build outward 
from an instrumental community’s gray markets and culture of circulating people, ideas, 
and materials, rather than bringing a management-driven, profit-focused ideology into 
that community.  DI was the brainchild of Virgil Elings, one of Paul Hansma’s colleagues 
in the physics department at UC Santa Barbara.  Elings first contact with the STM 
community, though, was Niko Garcia, a visiting Spanish academic with close ties to IBM 
Zurich.  After talking with Garcia and Hansma and attending the 1986 STM Conference 
in Spain, Elings saw a market for an off-the-shelf STM and offered to co-found a 
company with Hansma.  Hansma was even more wary than Quate of commerce 
encroaching on his lab’s activities, so he declined; but he gave Elings the same advice 
and schematics he made available to other STMers.
45  With this, Elings and his son built 
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  23a prototype in their garage and entered it in a junior high science fair (where it took last 
place, since, as the judges pointed out, “everybody knows you can’t see atoms”).
46
  For Elings, building the prototype was a chance to make sure the Hansma design 
was commercializable, but also to test – and discard – many axioms of STM-building that 
accrued since 1981.  Elings saw STM builders’ trade secrets as geared to instruments that 
were finicky and difficult to operate; and he saw possession of these trade secrets as 
limiting the STM community to those deemed “serious” enough to build their own 
microscopes.  Elings wanted, eventually, to make STMs specifically for non-builders 
who demanded a simple-to-operate black box.  Thus, he delighted in “debunking” the 
STM-builders’ recipes by creating a more streamlined, easy-to-use, more durable tool. 
  Elings wanted DI to be the first to market a commercial microscope by the annual 
STM Conference in 1987.  Though his plan was always to sell a computer-controlled 
microscope (hence Digital Instruments), his former student (and DI co-founder), Gus 
Gurley, was brought in too late to finish all the code in time.  Instead, Elings marketed 
the analog Nanoscope I as DI’s first product.  Probe microscopists from this era – both 
builders and buyers – remember their first acquaintance with the Nanoscope as a turning 
point.  Now, for the first time, researchers could join the STM community without having 
to build any part of their microscope.  Moreover, unlike Smith’s clients, DI’s customers 
didn’t need to have personal ties to the community; people could (and did) simply call up 
Digital Instruments and order a microscope. 
  Yet though it marked an important shift, the Nanoscope I still illustrates the 
gradual, emergent character of commercialization.  Digital retained much of the flavor of 
a lab like Quate’s or Hansma’s; and Elings only slowly came to sell a more and more 
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  24complete microscope, to rely less and less on customers’ design expertise, and to view 
money as the primary token of exchange.  Like the CSS STM and Doug Smith’s 
instrument, the Nanoscope I was more a kit than a full-fledged, black-boxed research 
tool.  Indeed, Elings now calls this era at DI the “toy business” – both for the Nanoscope 
I’s immature design, and for its lack of “serious” applications.
47  In following Hansma’s 
lead, Elings designed an air STM, rather than the expensive, narrow-niche ultrahigh 
vacuum instruments used at IBM and Bell Labs.  This made sense in opening up a broad 
market, since few disciplines were willing to deal with or pay for ultrahigh vacuum 
(which, in any case, ruined samples relevant to everyone except surface scientists).  Yet it 
was unclear in the ’80s what air STM could be used for, or what the images it produced 
meant.  Only in 1991-2 did a consensus develop that air STM was not, in fact, relying on 
tunneling for its contrast mechanism, and that many well-publicized air STM images 
(particularly of DNA) were erroneous.  As a result, most air STMers abandoned the 
technique and followed Quate and Hansma to AFM, usually by buying one of DI’s 
newly-available “Multimodes” (capable of running both STM and AFM). 
  Thus, the Nanoscope I and other air STMs had little rigorous application, though 
until 1992 it seemed possible such applications would appear if researchers could buy 
cheap commercial STMs and adapt them for unforeseen purposes.  The Nanoscope I was 
a ‘toy’ because it was meant to be superseded, and because its buyers were envisioned as 
instrument-savvy and willing to experiment playfully with their new device until 
promising applications were found (not unlike DI’s engineers themselves).  This 
assumption of similarity between designers and users allowed new designs and 
applications to flow in from the market and inform production of the more black-boxed, 
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  25all-digital Nanoscope II.  Hence innovation came rapidly because participants in the 
probe-microscopy field comprised an experienced and critical body.  In fact, researchers 
who had previously built their own STMs formed a small but elite group of DI’s early 
customers. 
  The assumed similarities of DI’s engineers and early customers also reinforced its 
self-image as a freewheeling startup that could rely on its users to make up for its lack of 
marketing and customer service.  Elings had no sales force – he simply advertised in 
Physics Today – (“$25,000 for atomic resolution”) and orders came in.  Instruments were 
FedExed to buyers, who put them together and got the microscope running on their own.  
Despite this minimal marketing and customer service (and limited product utility), the toy 
business was successful.  An advertisement from 1990 estimates that in the first three 
years, DI sold more than 300 Nanoscopes at $25,000 to $35,000 each.
48  The probe 
microscopy community expanded quickly, and the center of gravity shifted as well; as 
more people bought instruments, AFM and air STM began to outweigh UHV STM, and 
the corporate labs became less dominant.  High demand created a waiting list, prompting 
a policy that researchers who wanted a microscope quickly could promise to name DI’s 
founders or employees as co-authors on papers generated with Digital’s products. 
  DI recognized that to create a market among scientists and engineers, it had to 
demonstrate its trustworthiness as a producer both of microscopes and of knowledge.
49  
Through its customers, DI associated credible facts with its instrument and its employees, 
enticing consumers of those facts to join the probe microscopy community by becoming 
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  26consumers of its products.  Notably, because the community still largely operated on a 
gray market, Digital had to rely heavily on barter – such as trading waiting list position 
for authorship.  Such trades gradually diminished as the probe microscopy community 
became more commercial; indeed, “commercialization” often signifies the narrowing of 
the varieties of exchange as a technology stabilizes, rather than the encroachment of a 
peculiarly corporate ethic into the academy.
50
The Start-Up Era 
  The end of the toy business roughly corresponded to the end of DI’s solitude in 
commercial probe microscopy.  By 1990, the probe microscopy community was growing 
dramatically, fueled by (and fueling) the appearance of a rash of new STM and AFM 
manufacturers.  Their products and strategies differed considerably – some competed 
with Digital Instruments for the general-purpose microscope market, some targeted 
specific disciplinary niches, some made easy-to-operate black boxes, some built “open 
architectures” for researchers who wanted to tinker with and modify the device.  Some 
survived, others floundered.  All were small companies, mostly founded out of 
universities specifically to make probe microscopes, though a few drifted to that product 
line.  No big firms made more than desultory attempts to sell STMs or AFMs – though a 
few (Hitachi, IBM, Perkin Elmer) started down that road. 
  Crucially, these start-ups were founded for a deliciously diverse set of reasons.  
Most debates about academic capitalism simply assume that, under the current set of 
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  27incentives and stimuli, professorial start-ups are an inevitability – for good or ill, the 
inducements for professors to commercialize their work is simply irresistible.  Maybe so, 
but this assumption looks less reliable when the contingent and often counter-intuitive 
reasons why people found start-ups are examined.  Digital Instruments provides a striking 
example.  DI and Elings thrived at UCSB’s disreputable margins.  When he arrived in the 
late ’60s as a brash, confrontational professor, it was hoped Elings would build UCSB’s 
reputation in high energy physics.  His swagger, though, led to conflict with his 
department, which sidelined him into running their less prestigious Master’s of Scientific 
Instrumentation program – a lucrative but unloved backwater.
51  Uncowed, Elings 
transformed the master’s program into his personal empire and a fountainhead for patents 
and start-up companies. 
  In the master’s program students from many educational backgrounds (biologists, 
engineers, even psychology majors) learned to build all kinds of measurement 
technologies – not just research instruments but also industrially-relevant meters and 
tools.  Initially, Elings relied on orthodox classroom instruction; but soon, he drifted 
toward an alternative method that prized tacit over formal knowledge, participation over 
instruction.  Instead of textbooks and lectures, he simply connected students with 
professors on campus who needed instruments built and let them learn by doing.  
Because student projects were based on finding solutions to real problems faced by local 
researchers, they often yielded technologies Elings could market to those researchers’ 
subdisciplines.  Students learned how to understand customers’ needs and design 
technologies to answer them.  This made former master’s students the most important 
source of early employees for all Elings’ ventures, especially Digital Instruments. 
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  28  So UC Santa Barbara did, in a way, encourage creation of DI, though no school 
would replicate their path.  By sidelining a brilliant but difficult professor to the poorly-
regarded master’s program, they encouraged him to reject campus culture, denigrate 
academically-instilled formal knowledge, and be receptive to the commercial possibilities 
of the tacit knowledge his students accrued.  Moreover, in making clear Elings’ 
commercial ventures hindered his academic career, the UCSB physicists made it more 
likely his next enterprise – Digital Instruments – would be his bridge to leaving 
academia.  Tension between Elings and UCSB even smoothed technology transfer from 
Hansma to DI, since Elings’ hostility toward academic researchers meant he rejected 
Hansma’s designs until they had been engineered to look more like commercial products 
than most home-built instruments. 
  Disgruntlement of a different kind also fueled both DI and some of its 
competitors.  Several of the early STM and AFM manufacturers were founded in the 
heart of the West Coast military-industrial complex.  Graduate students who had grown 
accustomed to the picturesque surroundings and lifestyle of southern California often 
sought employment nearby – usually with defense firms like Lockheed and Hughes.  Yet 
defense work galled many of these engineers, driving them back to probe microscopy.  
Much of Elings’ early work-force came to DI for this reason; and in Los Angeles Paul 
West, one of John Baldeschwieler’s former postdocs at Caltech, grew so frustrated with 
defense work that he started his own probe microscopy company, Quanscan. 
  In several cases, start-ups positioned themselves relative to each other in ways 
that mirrored the relationships between the academic groups with which they were 
associated.  Digital Instruments may not have been officially affiliated with the Hansma 
  29group at first (indeed, even at the best of times, there was always some suspicion between 
the two groups), and Elings was certainly proud of the ways the Nanoscope differed from 
Hansma’s microscopes; but DI’s products bore an obvious genealogical kinship with 
Hansma’s STMs and AFMs, and DI drew on Hansma’s reputation in the community.  In 
return, Hansma’s design innovations spread much farther and faster than those of 
professors not affiliated with a start-up.  Thus, Hansma’s peers in the probe microscopy 
elite were more enthusiastic than he about helping former personnel found start-ups.  For 
instance, two Stanford postdocs, Sung-Il Park and Sang-Il Park (no relations) started Park 
Scientific Instruments in 1989 with Quate’s help and quickly became the major employer 
of Quate group veterans; PSI’s designs, even more than DI’s, were ported straight from 
the academic group, and the research in new applications conducted there often picked up 
where Quate’s own research left off.
52  Commercialization is the politics of academic 
research by other means. 
  Similarly, just as Baldeschwieler’s groups always lagged behind Quate’s and 
Hansma’s in popularizing its discoveries and innovations, the company he helped Paul 
West found, Quanscan, lagged behind DI and Park Scientific in marketing 
commercialized versions of the Caltech designs.  As Bourdieu might put it, relations 
defined by intellectual capital in the academic field mapped onto relations of commercial 
capital in the start-up field.
53  These relations could sometimes be based on collaboration 
as much as competition.  For instance, Stuart Lindsay, a physics professor at Arizona 
State University, had been an early collaborator of Hansma’s, one of the first in the long 
series of visitors to UCSB who helped adapt the STM to new applications and 
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  30subdisciplines – in Lindsay’s case, for electrochemistry and for biological materials.  
Once Hansma’s designed were commercialized by DI, Lindsay pressed Elings to adapt 
the Nanoscope for Lindsay’s colleagues in electrochemistry and biophysics – to no avail, 
since Elings was usually hostile to adapting the Nanoscope for anyone (DI had a strict 
no-custom-instruments policy), especially when the suggestion came from outside the 
company.  So Lindsay founded his own company, Molecular Imaging, to make 
attachments to the Nanoscope that would make it more compatible with electrochemistry 
and biophysics – attachments which DI grudgingly distributed for a few years until it 
developed its own competing line.
54
  Lindsay’s other motivations for founding a start-up say a great deal about how 
commercialization and pedagogy fit together in instrumental communities.  Long before 
Molecular Imaging, his group – like Hansma’s at UCSB – had become a center for 
distributing blueprints and (especially) software to new STM builders.  One of Lindsay’s 
technicians, Uwe Knipping, developed one of the first and most sophisticated computer-
controlled microscopes; Knipping’s software formed the basis for Lindsay’s academic 
network-building, but it also caught the eye of two local entrepreneurs, Larry and Darryl 
McCormick, who founded a company, Angstrom Technology, to commercialize it.
55
  As it turned out, Knipping’s architecture was far too sophisticated for a 
commercial instrument, and the enterprise failed.  But Lindsay had gotten a taste for how 
network-building in the academic domain might be enhanced by commercialization.  So a 
few years later when he happened on a former postdoc who was having trouble finding 
work, Lindsay decided to built a new company – Molecular Imaging – around him as an 
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  31extension of the work going on at ASU.
56  This is probably the classic – if woefully 
understudied – story of commercialization: a professor’s technicians and graduate 
students make a widget, then the professor’s colleagues call up asking for their own 
widget (or blueprints thereof), a student start making batches of widgets in their garage, 
and eventually – whether to help position the professor within that instrumental 
community or to give lab personnel needed work – the widget-making is spun off as its 
own kind of organization.  Commercialization here makes the academic research more 
streamlined and focused by being an extra bin in which to throw specific kinds of much-
needed people and community-building work. 
  In only a few cases were probe microscope start-ups inspired by the incentives to 
commercialize and culture of entrepreneurialism so central to the debate about academic 
capitalism.  Paul West, for one, explicitly saw entrepreneurship as a challenge and path to 
personal growth, and the Baldeschwieler group had a long history of spinning off 
commercial enterprises.
57  Similarly (but to a much lesser extent) the Parks and their 
employees molded PSI in the image of Stanford’s tradition of commercialization, and 
Quate’s particular tradition of sending former students to the most powerful firms in 
Silicon Valley.  Yet these start-ups’ success was seemingly in inverse proportion to the 
entrepreneurial intent of their founding.  Quanscan (and its successor company, 
Topometrix) was always the most business-like – had the most venture capital money, the 
most MBAs, the slickest advertising, etc.  But these proved a drag on the company’s 
fortunes – the bankers continually interfered in operations, the MBAs had trouble 
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  32understanding the values of an instrumental community that they had never participated 
in, and the advertising alienated many potential customers. 
  Park Scientific, like DI, was a more rough-hewn affair – Sung-Il Park’s barber 
was hired as the office manager, for instance, and the senior management were Quate 
students with no business training.
58  Indeed, the Parks carved a niche for their 
instruments by cultivating an image of themselves as interested much more in technically 
sweet innovations than in mundane moneymaking.  As “gentleman scientists,” they could 
speak as peers with other researchers and capture customers’ trust.  Park Scientific gained 
a reputation for making “builders’” instruments – well-crafted, reliable, with enough 
idiosyncracies and innards showing to be reminiscent of a microscope made by a 
graduate student.  Park was even willing to work with individual customers to build a 
microscope for a specific application (something DI never did) – if the engineering 
required a certain finesse.  Yet ultimately this sapped the company.  Park rode to some 
success on the same hostility to management expertise as DI; but Digital ultimately won 
out because (once the toy business was over) it displayed an almost equal hostility to the 
expertise of its customers.  Where Park was willing to relive the days of the Quate lab by 
respecting the knowledge of foreign disciplines, DI made one type of microscope for 
everyone, and hid the workings of that instrument completely from customers’ view.  
This attitude allowed DI to break into the industrial market, where it could sell radically 
more, and more expensive, microscopes to companies that usually wanted low-level 
technicians to learn how to use the instrument in a day or two – market conditions for 
which Park was wholly unprepared. 
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  33  As much as DI eventually prospered by distancing itself from Hansma’s academic 
model, though, the company’s success hinged equally on continual borrowings of culture, 
people, and inventions between start-up and academic lab.  By chance, these borrowings 
were facilitated by Elings and Hansma’s convergence on similar pedagogical 
philosophies.  Both me saw tacit, rather than formal, knowledge as primary in instrument-
building – Elings because of his work in the instrumentation master’s program, Hansma 
because the contours of the STM community had pushed him to encourage undisciplined 
instrument-building rather than disciplined instrument-use.  This shared emphasis on the 
tacit meant both men took in people with diverse and unusual educational backgrounds: 
junior high students, river guides, undergraduates, yoga instructors, retirees, psychology 
majors, and historians.
59  This diversity was unthinkable at other centers of probe 
microscopy.  Orienting to tacit knowledge also meant both DI and the Hansma group 
thrived on self-cultivating activities seemingly unrelated to technical matters; Hansma’s 
group found technical inspiration in pastimes such as woodworking, meditation, 
photography, yoga, river-rafting, etc; while DI held weekly “inventing sessions” where 
employees brainstormed solutions to esoteric (i.e. non-AFM-relevant) technical questions 
(e.g. “how do you make a self-balancing laundry machine”) to become better inventors 
and hone their skills at weathering Elings’ intense skepticism.
60
  As members of DI and the Hansma group became aware of parallels between 
their organizational styles, they appropriated these similarities to accelerate the two-way 
flow of people, materials, designs, and knowledge.  After the initial phase (when most DI 
employees were Elings’ former master’s students), several Hansma graduates, postdocs, 
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  34and collaborators took high-ranking jobs at Digital.  Individuals on both sides 
collaborated to transform Hansma’s research into commercial products; for instance, the 
Hansma AFM (on which DI’s fortunes eventually rested) was turned into a product 
through negotiations between Barney Drake (Hansma’s technician) and James Massie (a 
former Elings student) over which elements of the Hansma design were indispensable 
and which were too finicky for anyone but the graduate students who built them.
61  As 
DI’s sales increased, the Hansma group kept its place at the forefront of the AFM 
community through its steady supply of DI instruments and the ability of Hansma’s 
students and postdocs to go up the road to DI to scavenge parts and advice.
62  That is, 
whatever his initial reservations about commercialization, Hansma came to see the 
partnership with DI as a way to position himself – intellectually and socially – within his 
instrumental community. 
  In turn, once the “toy business” ended in the early ‘90s, Elings began to imitate 
Hansma’s tactic of bringing in postdocs to guide instrument-builders’ efforts.  DI built its 
own group of researchers from biophysics, magnetics, and polymer chemistry, who (like 
Hansma’s postdocs) worked with instrument-builders, developed and published on new 
STM and AFM applications, and traveled to give talks and attend conferences to spread 
word about the technique.
63  Though DI was a profit-making venture, its success arose 
partly from the Hansma group practices that it mirrored – doing research, publishing 
articles, training and “graduating” employees.  These practices were then widely 
emulated by the other start-ups. 
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  35  This kind of cultural/organizational parallelism from university to start-up is well-
documented in other fields of commercialization, especially biotechnology; there, it was 
used to entice professors to exit the ivory tower, leading to trouble when professor-
entrepreneurs were reluctant to turn their companies from research to profit-making.  
With STM and AFM, in contrast, corporate-academic isomorphism was successful less as 
a deliberate strategy than as a contingent and emergent harmonization of practices.  It 
was a largely accidental outcome of the organization of this instrumental community that 
Quate, Hansma, and other academics promoted a gray market of circulating people, 
practices, and technologies that fostered successful commercialization. 
Conclusion 
  So what does probe microscopy tell us about commercialization of academic 
knowledge and the value of corporate-academic linkages?  First, the development of 
probe microscopy shows how thoroughly – yet intricately and indirectly – the corporate 
and academic worlds are connected.  The locus of ‘academic research’ is much wider 
than the university campus, just as the locus of ‘commerce’ is wider than the for-profit 
business.  Instrumental communities and other informal organizations are distributed 
across academic and corporate institutions.  Commercialization – the transformation of 
academic research into commerce – is not a simple pipeline from university to firm.  
Commercialization can play many roles within an instrumental community, and academic 
research can be traded for many things other than money.  Attempts, therefore, to directly 
stimulate and accelerate the transformation of academic research into cash may well 
backfire.  As we have seen, it was the looser, indirect ties between corporate and 
academic groups that fostered the growth of STM and AFM and encouraged startups to 
  36emerge from universities, rather than direct pressure from corporations or overt 
incentives from governments and universities. 
  Thus, proponents of academic entrepreneurialism should be wary of focusing too 
narrowly on increased profit as the fruit of a commercialized university.  As we’ve seen, 
trading goes on all the time in instrumental communities; the token of exchange is usually 
a mix of knowledge, prestige, personnel, time, materials, money, opportunity, etc.  The 
popularity of various forms of barter changes as the instrumental community changes; 
commercialization can restrict some exchanges and make money-based trades more 
prevalent.  Few instrumental communities reach this point, though.  Even within the 
probe microscopy community, only the atomic force microscope and the magnetic force 
microscope have been commercial successes; the STM, which provided the first product 
for microscope manufacturers, was effective in training engineers to build microscopes, 
but never found industrial application.  The presence of gray markets in instrumentation 
can enhance national economic growth over time; yet university administrators who hope 
that this or that gray market can be converted into a profit-making start-up to enhance 
local, short-term economic growth will almost always be disappointed. 
  Moreover, development of an entrepreneurial instrumental community may 
require that its members be drafted from less profitable fields where commercialization 
did not occur.  The STM and AFM community, for instance, initially drew on its 
members’ expertise in low-energy electron diffraction, sandwich tunnel junction 
spectroscopy, and field ion microscopy – instrumental communities with poor records of 
commercialization; later, STM and AFM pulled in participants from many fields (surface 
science, biophysics, mineralogy, electrochemistry, polymer science – some more 
  37commercialized than others) who aided groups like Quate’s and Hansma’s in their gray 
market activities.  Instrumental communities in which the cultural map is unconducive to 
profit-making nevertheless provide the infrastructure and knowledge/labor pool for 
communities in which profit may be enormous.  Policy-makers should not think they can 
predict which will be which; nor are they likely to succeed if they encourage only the one 
at the expense of the other.  Policy makers may be best advised to encourage professors 
to foster gray markets within their instrumental communities – whether as consumers, 
producers, or both.  Gray market activities of trading research materials, people, and 
components of technologies enlarge the outlook of academic research.  By focusing on 
the wider instrumental community surrounding a technology, we can see that the 
university may actually be more influential in maintaining a pool of skeptical, 
independent consumers who can threaten start-ups with the prospect of making their own 
tools or even founding their own firms. 
  Finally, both opponents and supporters of corporate involvement in university life 
have seized on grains of truth.  Supporters have it right that corporate-academic linkages 
are desirable, even necessary, for research and innovation.  There was no golden age 
when faculty operated independent of firms, pursuing disinterested research; knowledge 
production in physics, engineering, and chemistry was always aided by faculty consulting 
and trading of personnel and ideas.  The oft-criticized commercialism of the “biotech 
revolution” merely extended long-standing entrepreneurial practices into molecular 
biology.  The STM and AFM case does, however, give reason for opposing the notion 
that universities should be run as businesses, squeezing profit where they can and 
operating along the “rational” lines of modern management.  The probe microscopy 
  38community developed rapidly because participants could point to different institutional 
poles – corporations, universities, national labs.  At times, innovation occurred because 
these poles were opposed – as when Hansma and Quate shifted from surface science and 
UHV STM to new designs and applications.  At other times, innovation occurred because 
participants strung out hybrid forms between these poles – the gray market of software 
trading, the CSS STM, and the “toy business”.  Instrumental communities rely on a 
variety of actors, contained in different kinds of institutions.  If all these institutions are 
run on the same highly-managed, profit-driven model, then the movement of people and 
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